Leibniz: Theory of Monads

IntroductionWhether ultimately correct or non, Leibniz rejects both Cartesianism and atomism. What ought non be missed is that throughout his objections Leibnizs focus neer strays outlying(prenominal) from the mereological issues of completes, separate, their unit of measurementy, etc. Indeed, the very nature of his p arentages against the mechanist project cl betimes dispute Leibnizs underlying c oncern for the problem of the continuum, which seems never very far from his mind. (Thompson)In rejecting Cartesianism, Leibnizs concern is with its inability to make sense of the whole, demur at the write off of the realisticity of the part. In rejecting atomism, his concern is with its inability to make sense of the parts, except at the expense of the unity of the whole. N all can provide glisterer sufficient to escape from the second labyrinth, and the entire mechanist project t presentfore finds itself impaled effectively on both horns of a p twinkle. Since the problem o f the continuum has so a great deal relevance to the unity of substance, Leibniz considers mechanist ism inadequate. (Brown)Remaining entirely in character, it should not be surprising that Leibnizs own metaphysics is most fundament every last(predicate)y an attempt to reconcile the mechanical philosophy to that of Aristotle. He attempts to take the best of each of these both systems and synthesize a new system that manages to escape their individual defects. (Thompson) Monads argon the unit of substance which supposedly bridge the gap amongst the old and the new, and common scold the holes in mechanist theories. Thus, it is with this in mind that his parentage for the existence of monads essential be examined, for it is the very heart of Leibnizs guess of substance.At the core of Leibnizs metaphysics genius finds monads, which ar dimension slight and windowless centers of force, the true substances that comprise the created universe. Infinite hierarchies of monads populate the continuum of all created things, each matchless mirroring the rest of the universe from its own unique point of view, expressing every separate monad with a greater or lesser degree of clarity. Monads are the metaphysical points, so to speak, which are the in partible, unified, and simpleton substances that are the foundation of the created ball. (Mercer)Distinguishing Features of Leibnizs Ontology at that place are two itemly significant distinguishing features of Leibnizs ontology as a whole. In brief, Leibnizs ontology frame as true to his desire to be the great comforter as it does to his comportations for substance, epistemology, and the problem of the continuum. This ought not be forgotten amidst the details that follow.Monads are a Synthesis of Old and New It is not surprising, in light of Leibnizs reconciliatory nature, that monads bear hallmarks of both Aristotelian and mechanistic philosophy. In wrong of the former, they do the work of substantial for ms, possessing an entelechy which guarantees that they unfold through time as they ought. In terms of the latter, they do the work of atoms, explaining how features in the phenomenal humankind (i.e., the macro-level world) gravel more than or less as a result of changes of state in the real world of monads (i.e., the micro-level world). The monad is, by its very definition, designed to leverage the strengths of the two opposing theories, firearm simultaneously inheriting none of their defects. (Mercer)From this it is clear that Leibnizs theory of substance is determined by his expectations, and by the perceived failures of mechanism. In collection it, Leibniz borrows liberally from what he considers the best features of the old and the new. Regarding those aspects in which Leibniz finds either of them inadequate, he crafts his own philosophy so that it avoids said inadequacies, essentially by definition.Qualitative, not Quantitative What is arguably most interesting and quite unique about this synthesis of systems is the shift in focus. To elucidate, Leibniz sees the mechanist philosophy as a fundamentally quantitative and extensive endeavor. The Cartesian defines the very kernel of embody as extension, which is quantitative in its extensive nature. Similarly, the atomist cannot help however construct the macro-level world by ingathering, through the grouping of m all extended enti affiliations in the micro-level world, which is as well as quantitative by nature. Both variants of mechanism therefore sustain a quantitative and extensive view of the relationships between wholes and parts, explaining or reducing soft features of the macro-level world in light of or to quantitative features of the micro-level world. (Mercer)Given the problems he finds with quantitative theories, Leibniz concludes that that the correct theory mustiness instead be uniquely qualitative and intensifier, quite a than quantitative and extensive, and this unique notio n is given figure of speech along very Aristotelian lines. Latta (1965) provides the following apt descriptionAccordingly, the essence of Leibnizs argument is that a quantitative conception of the relation of whole and parts affords an inadequate theory of substance. The common element in the contrary positions of the Cartesians and the Atomists is the unequivocal or implicit reduction of qualitative to quantitative differences. And it appears to Leibniz that the solution of the dilemma is to be found in the opposite hypothesis, namely, that the essence of substance is non-quantitative, and that the relation of whole and parts must be conceived as intensive earliest than extensive. Thus a simple substance has no parts, i.e. no quantitative elements, and all the same it must comprehend a manifold in unity that is to say, it must be real, it must be close tothing, it must be qualitative, specifically determined. (p. 27).The suggested intensive view of the relations between part s and wholes is noteworthy for its novelty if zilch else. What Leibniz seems to have in mind is that the parts of a whole in some way participate in that whole, and similarly that the whole somehow participates in all of its parts. The nature of this participation isnt entirely clear, but it is certain that the conception Leibniz holds is not the traditional apprehensiveness of the part-whole relation. There is something deeper at work here, some understanding that is intended to allow both the parts and the whole to remain clear and unified, the parts in themselves and the whole through its supernumerary relationship to the parts. (Thompson)What Leibniz seeks is some sense in which the whole somehow mirrors or expresses all of its parts, containing at bottom itself the explanation for why the parts are precisely as they are. And similarly, the parts must somehow mirror or express the larger whole as well, containing within themselves their explanations, while as well as mir roring the explanation of the whole, albeit with a lesser degree of clarity. The important degree of mutual inter-participation is what is key to the more innate or holistic relationship Leibniz intends. (Swoyer)Despite the present vagueness, however, this much remains clear Leibniz believes that the part-whole relation in sure unities must be something far more special than other philosophical systems have taken it to be. Leibnizs utilisation of monads is therefore intended not only to reconcile Aristotle with the mechanists, but also to lay the groundwork essential to make such(prenominal) a special relationship logically possible and plausible. (Thompson)The Argument From The MonadologyIn the first a few(prenominal) sentences of The Monadology, Leibniz gives one formulation of his argument for the existence of monads, a formulation which superpower be described most charitably as terse. Though this is not the only argument Leibniz gives for monads, it is probably the most w ell known. As early as 1671, for example, Leibniz argues for monads qua indiscrete unextended things, though in a much different fashion involving the proper beginnings of extended entities. (1969, p. 139-140)Because his earlier argument is even more terse than the later argument it shall not be discussed any(prenominal) further. It is worth mentioning only because its similarities mark it as a clear harbinger for Leibnizs later thinking on the subject. Further, Leibniz claims elsewhere that the existence of monads whitethorn be inferred from his doctrine of the pre-established harmony, though his reasons for this remain obscure. (1985, p.80)Returning to the better known argument of The Monadology, while it would be unreasonable to fault Leibniz for his brevity in reservation the argument, it is nevertheless the case that much remains to be said onward the argument can be accepted, rejected, or even understood adequately. Because the monad is at the very heart of Leibnizs metap hysics, one might reasonably expect a more complete formulation of his argument to be possible, fair(a) as one might expect Leibnizs critics to focus their attacks upon that argument if monads qua simple substances are to be rejected.For the purposes of this essay, it is necessary to understand this argument and the issues underlying it in order to make clear precisely how Leibniz takes the monad to be fall in and simple. The following is Leibnizs argument for the existence of monads as given in The MonadologyThe Monad, of which we shall here speak, is postcode but a simple substance, which enters into compounds. By simple is meant without parts. 2. And there must be simple substances, since there are compounds for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple things. (1989, p.213)Common finger ObservationsRelevant Observations For Leibniz, the observations relevant to a theory of substance are those of entities in the world. As established already, Leibniz simp ly looks at the world and takes inventory of what he sees. Among the entities perceived he finds what might be called macro entities of a comparatively mundane variety such as tables, chairs, rocks, streams, etc., as well as perhaps not so mundane macro entities such as plants, animals and persons. With the aid of the microscope, one may similarly perceive micro entities both mundane (e.g., crystals) and not so mundane (e.g., unicellular organisms). Further, with the aid of a telescope, one may perceive entities at the large end of the macro scale, if not, in fact, objects of an altogether different order of size. (Mercer)There are two primary points of interest as regards this body of observations. The first is that each entity, because it has extension, is divisible into parts. The second is that despite this divisibility into parts, the entities in question are more or less unities in some sense i.e., each entity is numerically one, and it is what it is rather than something else .To put these two points a bit differently, this body of observations indicates that for all such objects there seems to be a unified whole, just as there seems also to be discernable parts, which are similarly real and unified. A third less interesting but important point is that in each case one seems to find entities at every scale. No matter how high one turns up the telescope or the microscope, one never reaches the end of things. Wherever one looks, one finds worlds within worlds. alive TheoriesThis body of observations requires explanation. More to the point, Leibniz takes this body of observations to require an explanation in terms of some sort of substance. In virtue of what is it the case that some particular entity is a whole? In virtue of what is it the case that the parts of that entity are themselves both unified and real? Further, what relations are sustained between the wholes and their parts? And finally, what conclusions may be drawn more generally once answers to these questions have been established?These are the sorts of questions Leibniz has in mind when considering existing theories. A successful theory must address them adequately without falling into either internal conceptual contradiction or external contradiction. That is, the theory must cohere with the present body of observations, just as its predictions (if any may be made) must also cohere with both present and incoming observations. (Thompson)In terms of evaluating mechanist theories, there are only two that Leibniz takes as plausible candidates, Cartesianism and atomism. As established already, Leibniz considers both of these views to be inadequate for explaining the body of observations under consideration. Having already examined Leibnizs reasons for rejecting these systems in some detail we may live on directly to the next step, which involves synthesizing a new theory that avoids the inadequacies of mechanism while embracing its strengths.A Novel Theory of SubstanceIf b oth ends of the spectrum of mechanist philosophy are unacceptable, then why not head for the middle? Leibniz is confident(p) of unities in the world because of a wealth of observations, and he believes both the Cartesians and the atomists to be unable to explain such unities with their theories. (Thompson, p. 24-6) What is needed according to Leibniz is a theory whose fundamental unit of substance is both real and indivisible. It must be real for the obvious reason that it simply will not do to explain what does exist by appeal to what does not, and it must be indivisible in such a fashion that it may explain the genuine unity of the observed entities in the world.Further, it must provide a qualitative and intensive, rather than quantitative and extensive, construal of the part-whole relation, as previously discussed. Leibniz concludes, therefore, that what is needed is a new, staple fibre unit of substancephysical points are indivisible only in appearance mathematical points are choose, but they are merely modalities. wholly metaphysical points or points of substance (constituted by forms or souls) are exact and real, and without them there would be nothing real, since without true unities there would be no multitude. (1989, 142)This conclusion, which lays the foundation for the development of the remainder of Leibnizs metaphysics, owes its support to the two factors given earlier as motivations. Most central to it is the fundamental assumption that monadic unity is necessary at bottom for the production of all compound things. In light of this, it is possible to summarize the more complete formulation of Leibnizs argument for monads as followsP1 Common sense observations show that real, unified entities exist.P2 What is real may be explained only by appeal to something real.P3 What is unified may be explained only by appeal to something indivisible.C Therefore, the explanation for such entities in the world must involve real and indivisible substances, na mely, monads.This bears little relation, prima facie, to the less detailed argument given in the first two sections of The Monadology, but it is nevertheless reducible to that argument. P1 amounts to nothing more than the initial premise that compounds exist. P2 and P3 do not appear at all in The Monadology, but it is so-so clear from the preceding discussion that these principles are indeed assumed by Leibniz. Finally, the conclusion is just a restatement of the conclusion that monads exist. Again, to restate the argument more succinctly compounds exist, therefore simples exist.The remainder of Leibnizs metaphysical deductions in The Monadology follow from this more complete formulation at least as well as they follow the abbreviated version. Because monads must be both real and indivisible, Leibniz may argue that they can have neither extension nor form and must therefore be immaterial. Because they cannot be divided, Leibniz may still maintain that they cannot go out of existence in any natural way, by the disintegration of parts. Similarly, they cannot come into existence in any natural way, by the aggregation of parts, and so forth. Thus, this more complete formulation of the argument acts as a drop in replacement for its far more concise sibling. finishingTo summarize, Leibnizs argument for monads is an enthymeme, an argument with an implied premise. Examining the logical derivation suggests a line of notion that Leibnizs other writings explicitly affirm, namely, that there is no reality without unity. With this additional premise in hand, the argument for monads is rendered formally valid. Whats more, this additional premise provides a starting point for untangling the issues previously suggested as problems for monadic simplicity.The close tie between reality and unity prompts one to consider what Leibniz means by simple in a different light. It seems that what he intends in his argument for monads is not merely that they have no parts, but rather th at they also take a kind of indivisibility, an inability to be divided in any way that destroys them. If there is no reality without unity, then things that are fatally separable and thus not unified are not in and of itself real. The relation between reality and unity helps suggest the fatal inseparability criterion for simplicity.Further, it also seems that mereological simplicity and fatal inseparability are but negative entailments of a more positive construal of simplicity, namely, ontological simplicity. A thing is ontologically simple if it stands alone, or described negatively if it is self sufficient in the sense that it bears no internal relations of ontological dependence to any other thing. such(prenominal) an understanding of simplicity resolves the problems raised previously for the mereological construal, helps to make sense of Leibnizs argument for monads, and coheres nicely with the various other texts in which Leibniz uses the term.ReferencesBrown, Stuart. The Y oung Leibniz and His Philosophy. Dordrecht Kluwer AcademicPublishers, 1999.Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. (1969) philosophical papers and Letters, 2d ed. Translated and change by Leroy E. Loemker. Boston D. Reidel Publishing Company,Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. (1985) Theodicy. Translated by E. M. Huggard, edited by Austin Farrer. Open Court Publishing Company.Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. (1965) The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings. Translated and edited by Robert Latta. London Oxford University Press.Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. (1989) Philosophical Essays. Translated and edited by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. capital of Indiana Hackett Publishing Company.Mercer, Christia. Leibnizs Metaphysics. Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2001.Swoyer, Chris. (1995) Leibnizian Expression. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1), 65-99.Thompson, Garrett. On Leibniz. Belmont Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2001.